Perception is a kind of stop motion studio where for every frame the largely subconscious perceptual mind intervenes to make fine adjustments to a world model made of mind clay. This is our main orientational interface to a reality we can’t access directly. The conceptual mind abstracts from it—as well as relying on other sources of trustworthy information—to extend our model beyond the limited horizon of our senses. The combined result is a tenuous, vague sense of a conceptual universe of vast scope in time and space, with a narrow focus area of clear and concrete perceptual experience, limited to the situated immediacy of a first person perspective. Where is ‘reality’ in this picture?
Let’s imagine a scenario in which a hypothetical individual Outis lives in a multiverse, and in which the separate universes within the multiverse cannot possibly influence each other. In this scenario, Outis lives in universe A. Among the other universes, there is universe B, which is much more bizarre than universe A. One day Outis goes for a walk and finds a very strange rock that does not look like any rock that he has seen before. Upon examining this rock, he concludes that it must have come from universe B, for surely nothing so strange could have arisen in universe A. Content in his knowledge of the strange rock’s origins, Outis finishes his walk and returns home.
Upon initial inspection, it appears that Outis must be mistaken, as nothing in universe B can possibly influence universe A, and thus nothing from universe B can possibly originate from universe A. However, upon further inspection, it seems that there is something else wrong with this scenario. If none of the universes in the multiverse can influence each other, then how could Outis possibly know that he exists in a multiverse? Further, if none of the universes can influence each other, then how can Outis possibly refer to a universe that is not his own? It appears that the language that I used in this example is being very tricky: I use the phrase “universe B” twice, but these two usages cannot possible refer to the same thing, as one usage occurs from the perspective of an omnipotent narrator who has access to the “true” universe B, and the other occurs from the perspective of a hypothetical individual who cannot possibly have access to the “true” universe B. With this knowledge, let us rewrite the scenario to be less confusing:
Let’s imagine a scenario in which a hypothetical individual Outis lives in a multiverse, and in which the separate universes within the multiverse cannot possibly influence each other. In this scenario, Outis lives in universe A. Among the other universes, there is universe B, which is much more bizarre than universe A. One day Outis goes for a walk and finds a very strange rock that does not look like any rock that he has seen before. Upon examining this rock, he concludes that it must have come from ENTITY, for surely nothing so strange could have arisen in universe A. Content in his knowledge of the strange rock’s origins, Outis finishes his walk and returns home.
After deobfuscating this scenario, it becomes clear that our original analysis was incorrect, as we do not have enough information about ENTITY to conclude that Outis mistaken.
I think that epistemological solipsism runs into the same well-formedness problems that the above example illustrates. If we do not have access to “reality”, then what can “reality” possibly refer to? I ask this, because in this post, you state that:
“The essence of realism, whether naive, religious, scientific or otherwise, is to mistake a mental construct for reality.”
The language in this text is being very tricky: “reality” in this sentence is from the perspective of an individual making a claim, but if we buy the argument about epistemological solipsism, then it is not possible for individuals to refer to “reality” in the same sense as was used in the argument about epistemological solipsism. These two uses of “reality” cannot possibly refer to the same things because, according to epistemological solipsism, individuals cannot possibly know anything about reality, including whether or not it exists.
Thus, we can rewrite the sentence to be less confusing:
“The essence of realism, whether naive, religious, scientific or otherwise, is to mistake a mental construct for [ENTITY].”
After deobfuscating the sentence, it becomes clear that we cannot conclude whether realism is mistaken, as we do not know what ENTITY refers to. This is a very deep problem that any argument founded upon epistemological solipsism must contend with. To illustrate this further, imagine an individual says: “I subscribe to realism, I think that I have unmediated access to reality. I think that the arguments of epistemological solipsism are incorrect, and that their conception of reality is fundamentally flawed”. If we accept the premise of epistemological solipsism, then we must translate this as “I subscribe to realism, I think that I have unmediated access to ENTITY. I think that the arguments of epistemological solipsism are incorrect, and that their conception of ENTITY is fundamentally flawed”, for the reasons given above.
This example demonstrates that if we accept the premise of epistemological solipsism, then we can never show that an individual making such claims is mistaken, because they can never refer to the same “reality” that the argument for epistemological realism uses, and thus it is not possible for them to mistake ENTITY for “reality”.
Namaste. This is Krishna Keshava Das with the Princeton Bhakti Vedanta Institute. You may be interested in checking out "Idols of the MInd vs. True Reality" by our Serving Director, Dr. Bhakti Madhava Puri. https://bviscs.org/books/
“'It is probably justified in requiring a transformation of the image of the real world as it has been constructed in the last 300 years… [for] now it seems to work no longer. One must therefore go back 300 years and reflect on how one could have proceeded differently at that time, and how the whole subsequent development would then be modified. No wonder that puts us into boundless confusion!' :: a letter from Schrödinger to Einstein in 1950
The theme of the new book, Idols of the Mind vs True Reality by Bhakti Madhava Puri, Ph.D. is concerned with the clear exposition of the pivotal conceptions and misconceptions of Galileo’s and others’ ideas that produced the subsequent development of what would become modern mathematized science.
The confusions and almost complete ignorance that exist today regarding something so fundamental as consciousness is immediately cleared up when the obvious errors are seen in the ad hoc presumptions of the original founders of modern science who were blindsided by the metaphysical ontologies that held sway during their lives, but to which we no longer adhere, thanks to the development of philosophy beyond that period. We trace this progress out in a concise way in the book.
The modern mind, thanks to science education, is focused on the one-sided empirical approach to knowledge by sensuous perception, but this fails to account for the role of subjective cognition or conception – the role of consciousness in such perceptions. This artificial separation of the original unity-in-difference between conception and content has been rendered impossible to broach because of the historical metaphysical tradition of dualism firmly held by the fathers of modern science such as Galileo and Descartes.
The presumed impossible gap between subject and object is bridged once we realize that the object is what the subject knows it to be. This does not reduce the object to the subject as the abstract idealists (monists) naively are only too hasty to presume as an immediate identity (oneness). Mediation is involved; there are both difference and identity at play. It is merely lazy un-thinking that ignores the intricate dynamic in the mediating activity that is the heart and life of consciousness. The main purpose of the book is to restore the central importance of the conceptual moment that is integral to science and which makes it truly worthy of the name Science or scientific knowledge."
Super interesting piece. Although, I'm afraid that the way we live today so often limits our ability to speak of realism metaphorically. This is because our online life is increasingly memetic, referential and derivative - in a way, we are trapped in a symbolic box which has become more obvious, and even suffocating, as the years go by. I think there's a stagnation today as a result. The richness and colors that would make up metaphorical realism so often today give way to caricatures, social signals and abused narratives that are forced onto realism. Our world, as a result, has actually become a whole lot smaller.
Let’s imagine a scenario in which a hypothetical individual Outis lives in a multiverse, and in which the separate universes within the multiverse cannot possibly influence each other. In this scenario, Outis lives in universe A. Among the other universes, there is universe B, which is much more bizarre than universe A. One day Outis goes for a walk and finds a very strange rock that does not look like any rock that he has seen before. Upon examining this rock, he concludes that it must have come from universe B, for surely nothing so strange could have arisen in universe A. Content in his knowledge of the strange rock’s origins, Outis finishes his walk and returns home.
Upon initial inspection, it appears that Outis must be mistaken, as nothing in universe B can possibly influence universe A, and thus nothing from universe B can possibly originate from universe A. However, upon further inspection, it seems that there is something else wrong with this scenario. If none of the universes in the multiverse can influence each other, then how could Outis possibly know that he exists in a multiverse? Further, if none of the universes can influence each other, then how can Outis possibly refer to a universe that is not his own? It appears that the language that I used in this example is being very tricky: I use the phrase “universe B” twice, but these two usages cannot possible refer to the same thing, as one usage occurs from the perspective of an omnipotent narrator who has access to the “true” universe B, and the other occurs from the perspective of a hypothetical individual who cannot possibly have access to the “true” universe B. With this knowledge, let us rewrite the scenario to be less confusing:
Let’s imagine a scenario in which a hypothetical individual Outis lives in a multiverse, and in which the separate universes within the multiverse cannot possibly influence each other. In this scenario, Outis lives in universe A. Among the other universes, there is universe B, which is much more bizarre than universe A. One day Outis goes for a walk and finds a very strange rock that does not look like any rock that he has seen before. Upon examining this rock, he concludes that it must have come from ENTITY, for surely nothing so strange could have arisen in universe A. Content in his knowledge of the strange rock’s origins, Outis finishes his walk and returns home.
After deobfuscating this scenario, it becomes clear that our original analysis was incorrect, as we do not have enough information about ENTITY to conclude that Outis mistaken.
I think that epistemological solipsism runs into the same well-formedness problems that the above example illustrates. If we do not have access to “reality”, then what can “reality” possibly refer to? I ask this, because in this post, you state that:
“The essence of realism, whether naive, religious, scientific or otherwise, is to mistake a mental construct for reality.”
The language in this text is being very tricky: “reality” in this sentence is from the perspective of an individual making a claim, but if we buy the argument about epistemological solipsism, then it is not possible for individuals to refer to “reality” in the same sense as was used in the argument about epistemological solipsism. These two uses of “reality” cannot possibly refer to the same things because, according to epistemological solipsism, individuals cannot possibly know anything about reality, including whether or not it exists.
Thus, we can rewrite the sentence to be less confusing:
“The essence of realism, whether naive, religious, scientific or otherwise, is to mistake a mental construct for [ENTITY].”
After deobfuscating the sentence, it becomes clear that we cannot conclude whether realism is mistaken, as we do not know what ENTITY refers to. This is a very deep problem that any argument founded upon epistemological solipsism must contend with. To illustrate this further, imagine an individual says: “I subscribe to realism, I think that I have unmediated access to reality. I think that the arguments of epistemological solipsism are incorrect, and that their conception of reality is fundamentally flawed”. If we accept the premise of epistemological solipsism, then we must translate this as “I subscribe to realism, I think that I have unmediated access to ENTITY. I think that the arguments of epistemological solipsism are incorrect, and that their conception of ENTITY is fundamentally flawed”, for the reasons given above.
This example demonstrates that if we accept the premise of epistemological solipsism, then we can never show that an individual making such claims is mistaken, because they can never refer to the same “reality” that the argument for epistemological realism uses, and thus it is not possible for them to mistake ENTITY for “reality”.
Namaste. This is Krishna Keshava Das with the Princeton Bhakti Vedanta Institute. You may be interested in checking out "Idols of the MInd vs. True Reality" by our Serving Director, Dr. Bhakti Madhava Puri. https://bviscs.org/books/
“'It is probably justified in requiring a transformation of the image of the real world as it has been constructed in the last 300 years… [for] now it seems to work no longer. One must therefore go back 300 years and reflect on how one could have proceeded differently at that time, and how the whole subsequent development would then be modified. No wonder that puts us into boundless confusion!' :: a letter from Schrödinger to Einstein in 1950
The theme of the new book, Idols of the Mind vs True Reality by Bhakti Madhava Puri, Ph.D. is concerned with the clear exposition of the pivotal conceptions and misconceptions of Galileo’s and others’ ideas that produced the subsequent development of what would become modern mathematized science.
The confusions and almost complete ignorance that exist today regarding something so fundamental as consciousness is immediately cleared up when the obvious errors are seen in the ad hoc presumptions of the original founders of modern science who were blindsided by the metaphysical ontologies that held sway during their lives, but to which we no longer adhere, thanks to the development of philosophy beyond that period. We trace this progress out in a concise way in the book.
The modern mind, thanks to science education, is focused on the one-sided empirical approach to knowledge by sensuous perception, but this fails to account for the role of subjective cognition or conception – the role of consciousness in such perceptions. This artificial separation of the original unity-in-difference between conception and content has been rendered impossible to broach because of the historical metaphysical tradition of dualism firmly held by the fathers of modern science such as Galileo and Descartes.
The presumed impossible gap between subject and object is bridged once we realize that the object is what the subject knows it to be. This does not reduce the object to the subject as the abstract idealists (monists) naively are only too hasty to presume as an immediate identity (oneness). Mediation is involved; there are both difference and identity at play. It is merely lazy un-thinking that ignores the intricate dynamic in the mediating activity that is the heart and life of consciousness. The main purpose of the book is to restore the central importance of the conceptual moment that is integral to science and which makes it truly worthy of the name Science or scientific knowledge."
Super interesting piece. Although, I'm afraid that the way we live today so often limits our ability to speak of realism metaphorically. This is because our online life is increasingly memetic, referential and derivative - in a way, we are trapped in a symbolic box which has become more obvious, and even suffocating, as the years go by. I think there's a stagnation today as a result. The richness and colors that would make up metaphorical realism so often today give way to caricatures, social signals and abused narratives that are forced onto realism. Our world, as a result, has actually become a whole lot smaller.
Interesting! I think you’d like the book “The Fabric of Reality” if you haven’t read it already.